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NOTES AND COMMENT
cases as moves in the right direction, then it is suggested that
the contract clause, as amended, of the corresponding Texas
venue statute be looked to.' Since that amendment, the Texas
law on the point seems to have become fairly well established.'
Should the Legislature wish to adopt something similar to
what has been called, supra, the compromise solution, it would
seem in order to word the two sentences of Section 93-2904 in the
alternative; to specifically include all contracts, whether express
or implied; to provide that it is the defendant's performance, or
part of that performance, to which reference is made; and to
provide for either the application of ordinary rules of contract
interpretation, or for a special rule of legal implication. The contract clause of the justices' courts venue statute could serve as a
model.'
But should the Legislature, in the interests of procedural stability, consider a return to the rule of the Interstate line of cases
desirable, then it is suggested that the contract-tort clause be
placed ahead of the general venue section with the other exceptions; that the clause specifically include all contracts, express or implied; that it provide that it is the defendant's performance, or part of that performance, to which reference is
made; and that it provide for either the application of the ordinary rules of contract interpretation, or for a special rule of
legal implication, as in the venue statute for justices' courts.
WILLIAM R. McNAMER.
6Supra, note 48.
"See, e.g., Port Iron & Supply Co. v. Casualty Underwriters (1938) 118
S.W. (2d) 627; Rowan Drilling Co. v. Le Bus et al. (1938) 119 S.W.
(2) 97; Johnston et al. v. Personius (1951) 242 S.W. (2d) 471.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-6601.

CREDITORS' CLAIMS IN PROBATE; WHAT CLAIMS
MUST BE FILED WITHIN THE PERIOD OF
THE NON-CLAIMS STATUTE
The Montana non-claim statute applying to the filing of
creditors' claims in probate reads as follows:'
All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the
time limited in the notice, and any claim not so presented
is barred forever; provided, however, that when it is
made to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the
satisfaction of the court or judge, that the claimant had
1

R.C.M. 1947 §91-2704.
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no notice as provided in this chapter, by reason of being
out of the state, it may be presented at any time before
an order of distribution is entered; and, provided, further, that nothing in this chapter contained shall be so
construed as to prohibit the right, or limit the time, of
foreclosure of mortgages upon real property of decedents, whether heretofore or hereafter executed, but every
such mortgage may be foreclosed within the time and in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of this code,
other than those of this chapter, except that no balance
of the debt secured by such mortgage remaining unpaid
after foreclosure shall be a claim against the estate unless such debt was presented as required by the provisions of this chapter.
Our statute refers only to contract claims and necessarily
excludes tort claims arising during the decendent's life from the
condition precedent of filing a claim before bringing an action
against the estate for damages. In allowing the bringing of such
a claim after the expiration of the statutory period, one case' held
such a claim must be reduced to judgment before the amount
owed the claimant can be determined. The court also said that
"the character of claims (necessarily presented) . . . are such

as have come into existence by contract, express or implied."
Outside Montana, the decisions are conflicting on the necessity of
,presenting tort claims. In any event, action must be brought and
the claim liquidated by a judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior
to the expiration of the non-claim period or, at any rate, final
settlement and discharge of the personal representative. Since
the period for the presentation of claims has been shortened by
recent Montana legislation' with consequent earlier final settlement in the offing, tort claimants would be well advised to
promptly adjudicate their tort claims in the appropriate tribunals.
Our statute commences to run from the time of the first publication of notice to creditors by the personal representative of
the deceased.! Claims must be presented within four months of
such date, else they are forever barred.' And such claims must be
presented to the personal representative' as distinguished from
'Hornbeck
v. Richards, 80 Mont. 27, 257 P. 1025 (1927).
3
R.C.M. 1947 §91-2702.
'Supra,
note 3.
5
Supra, note 3. This section was amended in 1953 to make the period four
months for all claims regardless of the size of the estate. Prior to this
time, the period was 10 months for estates of $10,000 or over, 4 months
for those estates under that amount.
"R.C.M. 1947 §91-2705.
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those states requiring presentment to the court. Should the personal representative also be a creditor of the estate, he must file
a claim against the estate.' No suit may be brought until such
claim is filed with the personal representative,' therefore the suit
papers would not be a notice of the creditor's claim as intended
by the statute. It is undecided in Montana as to whether a personal representative may waive the statutory period, but our
courts would undoubtedly follow the majority rule and not allow it.
Montana follows the majority rule in holding that no claim
need be presented in actions of ejectment," and specific performance,' and it can be safely assumed our court would follow the
majority in ruling the same in actions for replevin,' suit to quiet
Such
title,' or a suit to impress a trust on specific property.'
claims are not claims of creditors as contemplated by the legislation, but rather are for possession of property by virtue of the
claimant's ownership, rather than a claim against the estate.
Presentation of claims upon a mortgage on a specific piece
of property is specifically excluded by the statute. But should
the property be insufficient to meet the debt, and a deficiency
exists, it must be presented as a claim within the statutory period.' A mortgagee would be well advised to present his claim even
though the debt is represented by a mortgage, regardless of how
sufficient the value of the property may seem to him.
Atkinson" suggests breaking the claims of creditors into
three classes; matured, unmatured and contingent. Such a classification can very aptly be applied to our statute, which specifically refers to ". . . contract claims due, not due, or contingent. " For the sake of clarification, the status of Montana cases
will be discussed under these headings.
(1)
Matured claims: This division can further be divided
into two classes; (a) those maturing before death and (b) those
maturing after death. No difficulty should be reached in this
category as indisputably, both must be presented within the statutory period. But those maturing after death must be distinguished from those arising after death, such as those for funeral
7R.C.M.

1947 §91-2722. See In re Rodger's Estate, 68 Mont. 46, 217 P. 678

(1923).
8R.C.M. 1947 §91-2711.
9

Lamme v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560, 2 P. 298, (1883).
"In re Estate of Banks, 80 Mont. 159. 260 P. 128 (1927).
"Moore v. Moore, 141 Miss. 795, 105 So. 850 (1925).
'McGuire v. Cunningham, 64 Cal. App. 536, 222 P. 838 (19=3).
"'Elizadev. Elizade, 137 Cal. 634, 70 P. 861 (1902).
"Mathey v. Mathey, 109 Mont. 467, 98 P.2d. 373 (1939).
"ATKINSON ON WILLS, Page 654.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1955

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 16 [1955], Iss. 1, Art. 7

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
expenses, administration expenses etc., as these become by operation of law the obligation of the decedent's personal representative. 6
(2)
Unmatured claims: Claims which will become due
after the non-claim statute has run must be presented within the
non-claim period. If the unmatured claim is liquidated no difficulty should arise as it differs from a matured claim only in that
it is not yet due. Our statutes do not provide for the proper manner in which to deal with such claims by the personal representative, but once again we may refer to Atkinson 7 wherein he suggests three plausible methods; (a) The amount to be due in the
future can be discounted to its present value and that sum paid
at once to the creditor; (b) the representative may retain a sum
sufficient to pay the obligation at maturity; or (c) distribution
can be made to the heirs who will be required to give a bond for
payment of their respective shares of the claim when it becomes
due. In the absence of authority to the contrary, it would seem
that the court could apply the most appropriate method for payment of the unmatured claims, depending on the facts. But by
requiring the presentation of unmatured claims, such creditors
are placed in the same position as matured creditors, in that they
too are under a duty to seek payment before distribution to the
heirs. It would seem that unliquidated, unmatured claims should
be presented during the period as though liquidated, even though
our courts have distinguished unliquidated, contingent claims
from liquidated, contingent claims.'
(3) Contingent claims-defined by Webster as being "an
event which may occur; a possibility; a casualty." In determining what is required to be presented under our codes, our courts
have placed Montana in a definite minority of states in not requiring the presentment of such claims. The contingent claim
cannot be treated in the same manner suggested for a matured
claim as the contingency may never occur. The final distribution
of the estate cannot be delayed as it may be years before the happening of the event contemplated, or it may never occur. The
same argument is suggested against the requirement of bond by
the heirs. Presentation of contingent claims could involve the
estate in administrative difficulties that could not be satisfactorily determined. On the other hand, there are several valid
reasons why contingent claims should be presented; namely, so
provision may be made for them, or so that any claim prejudicial
'Infra note 20.
I"ArKiNsoN ON WLs,, Page 655.

'Infra, note 20.
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to the estate may be investigated and contested if advisable before
evidence of the invalidity of the claim is lost.' The overwhelming
majority of the states are persuaded by the latter reasoning as
outweighing the difficulties such claims present, in requiring that
they be filed with the personal representatives.
Nathan v. Freeman," decided in 1924 but still prevailing in
our state, placed Montana in a decided minority, by holding the
statute does not apply to obligations arising after the death of the
decedent out of an executory contract entered into before death.
In this case, the decedent was a lessee of a building owned by the
plaintiff. The lease required the lessee to stand all expenses required to place the building in the condition it was in when the
agreement was entered into, and to pay for any additional assessment that might be made against the lessor for any addition the
lessee might add to the building. After the lessee's death, his administrator carried on the business for a time, but on failure to
pay the rent, the lessor terminated the lease. No claims were filed
within the period required. The court refused to allow the rentals
that were to become due on the ground that they were not presented within the statutory time, since they were within the classification of claims "not due." But as to the claims for damages
for failure to restore the building to its original condition, and for
the money plaintiff had to expend for assessments after the death
of the lessee, it was held that no claim need be presented under
the statute. It was at this point that the court varied from the
majority view. The theory relied upon by the court was based
on the fact that this was an obligation arising subsequent to the
death of the promisee on an executory contract. Quoting from
the decision, the court said;
"... these statutes of nonclaim have reference to an indebtedness existing at the time of the decedent's death,
not to such as arise subsequently by reason of a breach
of the executory contracts of the deceased. Such claims
are incident to the administration of the estate . . . the

executor alone is liable either personally or in his representative capacity, dependant on the facts."
But was not the court erroneous in the decision in the face of our
code which expressly provides for presentment of contingent
claims? It seems to their writer that the court attempted to
place the claim in a category reserved for claims arising after
the death of the decedent as to which the non-claim period would
41 A R 148.
270 Mont. 250, 225 P. 1015 (1024).
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not apply. It is unfortunate that the court did not discuss what
claims would then fall under the classification of "contingent"
should these be excluded. The decision is contrary to our code
as it abolishes the possibility of presentment of any claim contingently existing at death but becoming fixed and absolute after
the death of the decedent and is this not what is meant when
the statutes refers to a "contingent" claim? Is not an inchoate
claim in existence before death, even though the contingency occurs after death, upon which liability depends?
The court recognized the majority view as expressed in
Verdier v. Roach" but expressly refused to follow it. The facts
of the Verdier case are similar to the Nathan case in that an
agreement was entered into by the deceased lessor with the plaintiff lessee to keep the lessee harmless for any water damage occurring to the plaintiff's property due to water. Plaintiff remained in possession after the lessor's death and presented no
claim during the statutory period. Two years after death, plaintiff's property was damaged as anticipated by the lease, but the
claim was denied as it was an existing, valuable claim against the
estate during the statutory period and if it had been presented,
the administrator could have made due allowance for the happening.of the contingency. If still contingent on settlement of accounts, the amount the claimant would be entitled to could be
paid into court. The court recognized that difficulties very probably would arise in providing for payment of a liability that is
unliquidated and may never occur, but concluded that the difficulties could have been overcome due to general jurisdiction of
the probate court. This case seems to be the better reasoning
based upon a statute reading as does ours, and the legislative
purpose for a quick and satisfactory conclusion of probate and
disbursement to the heirs of property free from any claim. It is
submitted the Nathan case is contra to our statute.
However, there are practical difficulties under a statute requiring the presentation of contingent claims, viz;
(1) The ordinary man would hardly think of presenting a
claim regarding something he could often not anticipate as occurring, and,
(2) The court would have difficulty in estimating the
present worth of a possible future claim which might never arise.
It, therefore, is believed that non-claim statutes might well
be framed so as not to require the presentation of purely contingent claims, allowing distribution to the heirs, and provide
296

Cal. 467, 31 P. 554 (1892).
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that, if in the future, the contingent claim ripens into a fixed
claim, the creditor then have a right against the heirs to the extent they received valuable property from the deceased.
Thus, such a statute might provide that: All absolute claims,
whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall
be presented within four months of the first publication of notice
or be forever barred. Claims which are contingent as of the
death of the deceased and which become absolute within the four
months period shall be presented as fixed claims or be forever
barred; those becoming fixed thereafter, and before final distribution, may be presented subject to the right of the personal
representative to reject the claim on the grounds of delay and
inconvenience in getting his accounts 'ready for final distribution,
and, if the claim should be rejected under this latter category or
should become fixed even later, the creditor should have a right
against the heirs, devisees and legatees to the extent they participated in the bounty of the deceased.
A somewhat similar problem is presented in bankruptcy.
Section 63(a)8 of the Federal bankruptcy statute makes contingent claims provable, but section 57(d) provides that the
claim shall not be allowed unless the amount thereof is estimated
in the manner and within the time directed by the court, or if it
is determined that it is not capable of estimation, or estimation
would unduly delay the administration of the estate. The bankruptcy court is, however, concerned with making claims provable
where possible, since if not provable, the debtor is not discharged
therefrom; also, the limited assets being distributed in bankruptcy are probably all that will ever be available to the creditors. In decedent's estates, the question of a discharge is not
involved. Moreover, the majority of decedent's estates are not
insolvent, and no great injury is, therefore, apparent to contingent creditors in requiring that they proceed against the heirs.
II.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AN AGREEMENT TO
DEVISE
Remarkably enough, contracts to devise for consideration
rendered during the life of the promisor are not uncommon. Accordingly, a study of the remedy of specific performance under
our non-claim statutes is appropriate at this point. The term
"specific performance" cannot be employed in its strict sense in
this situation, as the court cannot make a will to comply with the
promise after the death of the testator. It is rather a remedy
that would regard the personal representatives or the heirs, de-
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visees or legatees as holding the property in question in trust for
the benefit of the promisee. The quetion then presented, after
determination of the right to the remedy of specific peformance,
is whther the promisee is a creditor as contemplated in our
statutes, or if he is rather a person who need not present a claim
within the statutory period.
Erwin v. Mark' is the authoritative case in Montana. In
that case the promisee managed the personal affairs of the testator during her life in consideration of a promise to leave the
promisee a legacy in the amount of $4,000. The testator left a
will with the agreed clause contained therein, but when the will
was admitted to probate, a petition was presented to revoke the
probate of the will. The plaintiff herein made no claim as a
creditor during the statutory period, and nine months after the
period for presentment of claims had expired, the will was revoked. Plaintiff then brought this action for specific performance of the contract, and asked that the defendants, the heirs of
the promissor, be declared to be trustees for the plaintiff to the
extent of $4,000. The defendants contended plaintiff's remedy
at law was adequate as he could have presented his claim according to the statute, and brought suit thereon if it had been rejected.
The court found the services rendered by the plaintiff were of
such nature as would not permit the court to determine the money
value of the services.'
Specific performance was granted, the
court holding the claim was not required to be presented during
the period reserved for claims of creditors on the theory as represented in the following quotation from the decision:
"The statute of nonclaim does not refer to claims of title,
or for the recovery of property, for the reason that
claims of such a character cannot in any just sense be
said to be claims against the estate of the deceased. On
the contrary, the right of recovery is based upon the fact
'105 Mont. 361, 73 P.2d. 537, 113 ALR 1064 (1937).
'The services rendered were determined to be of confidential and personal offices as could only be performed by a close relative or friend
and could not be purchased on an employment basis, and thus could not
be determination on quantum meruit.
A study of cases would allow the following to be important considerations to determine if specific performance would lie for a promise to
bequeath in return for consideration for services rendered:
(1) The relationship of the promisor and promisee.
(2) The type of service rendered: ie, was the element of love or
devotion necessary to render the service.
(3) The reasons for the desire of the promisor such services be
rendered.
(4) Was it in the contemplation of parties involved that such services be compensated in money?
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that the property claimed does not belong to the estate,
but belongs to the party asserting title to it."'
That a valid contract may be entered into to dispose of property
by will's is a rule recognized in all the states. And it is equally
well recognized that such a contract is subject to specific performance in that a trust will be declared in favor of the promisee
against the person or persons who presently have the property in
question in their hands.' But the question of which contracts are
entitled to specific performance must then be determined.
The defendants in the Erwin case contended therein that
an exception existed to the general doctrine, namely that when
the agreement specifies a sum certain in money there is an adequate remedy at law for breach of contract. There seems to be
serious conflict at this point, but the Montana court held such an
exception does not exist. Once again the court reasoned on the
basis of the type of claim contemplated in the statute. Recognizing the difference between a claim against an estate and a claim
based on a right of ownership, they refused to rule an agreement
for a sum certain in money would allow an adequate remedy at
law in the latter instance. Such a claim, they reasoned, could
not be satisfied until after the debts contemplated by the statute
had been allowd and paid. The plaintiff could not determine
the amount of the claim until after the claims had been satisfied,
which would of necessity not be until after the statutory period
had run. Plaintiff was claiming as a distributee, and if the estate
had been insufficient to satisfy these debts, the plaintiff would
receive nothing. But to require him to file a claim would but
make him a preferred distributee who would take pro-rata with
the creditors and before the other distributees under the will.
Thus the court reasoned:
"According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff
is not a creditor of the estate, in the sense that her claim
would have to be paid ahead of the bequests in case a will
were left by the deceased. By the very terms of the contract she was to become the beneficiary of a bequest in
the sum of $4,000. Whether she would actually get that
amount would depend upon, first, the amount of debts
owing by deceased, and second, whether after the debts
uThe court is quoting from Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S.W. 155
It should be noted though, this case deals with a promise to
(1912).
leave "all my estate" rather than a specific sum.
'Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742 (1898).
'"PAoGE OW WILLS (2nd. Edition) Vol. 1, §107. The subject matter is annotated in 113 ALR 1070, wherein it is recognized certain statutes may
expressly require the presentation of such a claim. This is not the case
in Montana.
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were paid, there was sufficient property in the estate to
pay all legacies in full. These issues could not be settled
in an action at law for damages."
This was held to be sufficient to require specific performance regardless of the type of services rendered, as the plaintiff could
not determine the exact amount of money to which he was entitled and so an action at law would not give adequate compensation, as damages could not be determined.
Although the latter, in regard to the type of services being
immaterial, is merely dictim of the court, it is felt that such is not
the law. Should the services be of an ordinary nature, damages
can be determined on a quantum meruit basis ' in a court of law.
This, of course, is true only when the property is still in the hands
of the personal representative as a court of law cannot declare a
trust in favor of the promisee. So such a claim, for services not
of extraordinary value, must then be presented during the statutory period.
The conflict that exists is then grounded upon the question
of whether "an agreement for a sum certain in money" is of
such a nature as to allow determination of the value of the claim
in a court of law, rather than in a proceeding in equity. The
view of the Montana court in the Erwin case is upheld in the case
of Ashbauth v. Davis,' an Idaho decision, which relied upon the
Erwin case in deciding that specific performance would be
granted regardless of the fact that the promise to be enforced was
for a sum certain in money. Therein, the Idaho court said:
"The fact that the promised bequest is a sum certain, or
ascertainable, in money does not appear to be a controlling factor."
The court felt that the real question involved was whether a resort to equity powers was necessary to give complete relief. It
was found to be the appropriate relief after determining the
necessity of imposing a trust on the distributees. The Idaho court
distinguished a case involving the management of ranch property
in return for a promise to will a certain tract of land to the
'BLAcKS

LAW

DICTIONARY

defines

"Quantum

Meruit" as; as much as

he deserved; the common count in the action of assumpsit, for work
and labor founded on implied assumpsit. ...
"71 Ida. 150, 227 P.2d. 954 (1951). This was not a personal service contract but rather an agreement between a husband and wife wherein
mutual contracts were entered into, each agreeing to will the title to all
community property owned by reason of the death of the other to the
heirs of the first decedent by a prior marriage.
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promisee.' Specific performance was denied in that instance because services of an intimate personal nature were not required
and the value of such services could easily be determined at law.
Therefore, Idaho would not follow the dictum of the Erwin case
that the type of service rendered is immaterial as to the propriety
of awarding specific performance. Both cases refer to a Colorado case ' which granted specific performance of a contract to
bequeath on the ground that it would be impossible to determine
the value of services rendered by any money standard. Again,
the court distinguished the type of claim contemplated by a
statute similar to Montana's and the type presented by one claiming a right in the property.
The conflicting view is represented by the case of Morrison
v. Land,' a California case involving a promise to pay a specific
sum in money for the promise of the plaintiff to remain in the
promisor's employment until the latter's death. The employment involved the management of a hotel. California recognized
the doctrine of specific performance of an agreement to devise
when the remedy at law is inadequate, ' such as where an element
of peculiar personal services is present that would be incapable
of compensation in money. But the court denied specific performance because the service rendered was not of the requisite
nature, and also, because the amount was specific. Therein, the
court said:
"In such an action (for breach of contract at law) the
measure of damages would have been the value of property agreed to be bequeathed, for that was the amount
in which he was damaged by the breach."
The California decision seems to be based on the theory that a
promise of a sum certain would allow the court to assume the
parties contemplated the services were intended to be com'

Andrews v. Aikens, 44 Ida. 797, 260 P. 423, 69 ALR 8 (1927). This case
might have been in error in denying specific performance as it involved
a promise to convey land. The court said the services required could be
compensated for in money damages as they were not of such personal
nature as to require otherwise. But the court overlooked the general
rule that a court of Equity will not look to the adequacy of the legal
remedy in a contract to convey land, to grant specific performance, but
based their decision on the fact the land involved had no peculiar or
special value, such as ancestral or sentimental, and the plaintiff had
made no improvements, nor had lived thereon. It was an oral contract,
but the fact the plaintiff had completely performed could remove it from
the Statute of Frauds.
8
Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 P. 489 (1914). The promise was made
to plaintiff's father, that if plaintiff, then a minor, would reside with the
promisor he would bequeath to her, on his death, one-third of his estate.
81169
Cal. 580, 147 P. 259 (1915).
'
" McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 70 P. 1008 (1902).
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pensated for in money.' T]ie Erwin case recognized the conflicting view as represented in the Morrison case, but expressly chose
not to follow it.
A distinction must be kept in mind between the situation
presented in the case under discussion, where the will actually
contained the bequest, and the situation where no will is made
at all, or if it is made, the promised bequest is omitted. In the
Erwin case it is entirely possible that the court was influenced
by the fact that the plaintiff bona fide believed the will was
sufficient to provide for him, and failed to file a claim as creditor
within apt time accordingly. The doctrine of equitable estoppel
has been applied in a workmen's compensation case" in Montana
to allow recovery by a claimant after the statutory period had
run. But also, it must be kept in mind that in that case, the
reliance was on an affirmative act committed by the agent of
the defendant, while in the principal case, the reliance was upon
the validity of the will and not upon an act done by the heirs.
It would seem that Montana has adopted the view more consistent with the theory behind the remedy. If the courts agree:
(1) That the claimant under the agreement should take only after
the other creditors have been satisfied, (2) that the purpose of
the statute is to allow the personal representative to make a
speedy and satisfactory distribution to the distributees, of which
the plaintiff is one, and (3) that a trust cannot be declared in an
action at law, then it is difficult to see how the court can reason
that a promise to leave a specific sum would require the claimant
to sue on breach of contract and to forsake his remedy in equity.
If the services were of such a nature, requiring attentions that
could not be purchased from anyone other than a person in a
certain relationship to the promisor, can a court of law determine
the value of such services to allow recovery for damages for
breach of contract?
It is difficult to determine the weight of authority on this
question since the statutes adopted in various states vary considerably. But in, the states which have statutes similar to ours,
'This theory of "intent of the parties" is further exemplified in Walder
v. Calloway, 99 Cal. App. (2d) 675, 222 P.2d. 455 (1950). Ia that case,
plaintiff, divorced wife of the promisor, left her home in the east to care
for the promisor during his last days, in return for his promise to leave
his entire estate to her. After finding the services rendered were of
extraordinary nature, the court allowed specific performance on the
theory that such services, as in the contemplation of parties, were not to
be compensated in money, and, as in contemplation of law, could not be
compensated for in money.
"Lindbloom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 295
P. 1007 (1930).
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it would seem that the Montana view has considerable support
and is better reasoning. It is doubted that any state would follow the dictum of the Montana court in holding that the mere
fact that the promisee could not take until the creditors had been
satisfied would be a sufficient reason to grant specific performance. Of course, it is apparent that if there was an actual intent
that the claimant would be compensated for the "reasonable
value" of the services, a different problem would be presented.
There is a danger present in filing a claim as a creditor as it
may have the effect of precluding an action for specific performance as an election of remedy. It is generally held, in the absence of extenuating circumstances that such presentment of a
claim as a creditor is a bar to an action of specific performance.'
Montana would no doubt follow the general rule, but certain
facts can be presented whereby the filing does not constitute a
final election.'
It must be kept in mind, however, in determining what procedure will best benefit your client, that an election to bring suit
for specific performance may place the claimant in a worse position than if a claim is filed against the estate for breach of contract. Should the estate. be insolvent, the creditors will be satisfied first and the claimant will share with the distributees on a
pro-rata basis from the remainder; thus the situation may arise
whereby he will receive nothing at all, or possibly only a reduced
amount.
JOHN R. DAVIDSON
'"Laird v. Laird, 115 Mich. 352, 73 N.W. 382 (1897) ; Reich v. Misch, 316
Mich. 264, 25 N.W. 2d. 57 (1946) ; Ballou v. First National Bank, 98
Colo. 101, 53 P.2d. 592 (1935).
'aRowe v. Eggum, 107 Mont. 378, 87 P.2d. 189 (1938). It is not an election of remedies so as to bar an action for specific performance when
made under a mistake of rights.

SUBROGATION CLAIMS IN INSURANCE AND
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE
The purpose of this article is to discuss the Real Party in
Interest Statue, and its particular application to Insurance Law.
Almost every state in the union now has a statute, which in effect
is a real party in interest statute. Section 93-2801, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947 provides:
"Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except . . ." (Exceptions not
applicable).
This statute had as its origin the New York Code, where this pro-
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